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Moral economy, solidarity and labour process struggle in Irish public transport 
Abstract  
This article empirically applies Knut Laaser’s integrated conceptual framework, combining 
Sayer’s moral economy (ME) theory with labour process theory (LPT), to examine how two 
rival Irish unions engaged with an uneven moral economy and consciously sought to build 
collective worker solidarity during a dispute over competitive tendering and marketization. 
Using qualitative data from a case study of BusCo in Ireland’s public transport sector, the 
article enriches sociological understanding of trade union solidarity, and how it is engendered, 
contested and experienced.   
 
Keywords: labour process, moral economy, public transport, solidarity, unions. 
 
Introduction  
Worker solidarity and resistance have been extensively researched (Doellgast et al., 2018; 
Edwards, 1990; 2018; Fantasia, 1988; Jansen at al., 2017; Marino et al., 2019; Kelly, 1998). 
Similarly, moral economy (ME) studies have increased recently, with some identifying worker 
resistance (Breslin and Wood, 2016; Khurana, 2017; Laaser, 2016; Mulinari, 2019).  However, 
very few empirical studies (see Laaser, 2016) merge Sayer’s (2005, 2011, 2015) ME approach 
with labour process theory (LPT) (Thompson and Smith, 2009, 2010, 2017; Smith, 2016). 
Laaser (2016) pioneered a theoretical framework effectively integrating fundamental LPT and 
ME aspects, to examine changing social and moral employee-manager relationships in bank 
work. This article empirically applies Laaser (2016)’s novel and holistic approach to enrich 
understanding of the changeable dynamics of how union solidarity is constructed and 
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experienced. The study examines the question: How does fusion of a contested labour process 
and multi-layered moral economy shape collective (union) solidarity during a dispute over 
restructuring at BusCo in the Irish public transport sector?  
By empirically applying Laaser’s (2016) framework, two contributions are made. First, the 
article demonstrates the dialectics of how ‘structured antagonism’ (Edwards, 1990, 2018) 
within the labour process is fused with lay morality, social relationships, commitments, shared 
ideas and union/representative agency, to activate overt collective solidarity. It also illustrates 
how collective solidarity is further enabled or inhibited by contextual political economy forces.  
This provides a more contextualised and dynamic account of workplace conflict, by identifying 
multiple social, moral and political economy forces influencing worker solidarity. Moreover, 
Laaser’s (2016) framework enables deeper theorization of workplace struggle focusing on 
human and moral (dis) connections. Applied to an empirical case study of BusCo, collective 
worker solidarity on the one hand reflects structured antagonism between managers and 
workers, underpinned by labour indeterminacy and competing concerns over control, as 
highlighted in LPT (Edwards, 1990, 2018; Thompson and Smith, 2010, 2017). 
Notwithstanding, on the other hand, collective worker solidarity reflects disconnected moral 
understandings between workers and employers around the nature and meaning of work and 
how employees and employers should treat each other. Collective workplace conflict in the 
Irish public transport sector also renders an interesting case study context to examine how 
collective worker solidarity is shaped by social and moral (dis)connections between co-
workers, and between workers and passengers.  
Second, the article advances ME scholarship by critically analysing unionized workers’ 
dynamic and intricate moral economy during a concrete dispute over state-driven competitive 
tendering/marketization in the Republic of Ireland, and by empirically demonstrating how 
LPT’s workplace/employment relationship-focused materialist analysis complements ME. 
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Laaser’s (2016) integrated framework utilizes LPT to capture moral economy unevenness. 
Moral understandings are theorized as noteworthy attempts to humanise economic and social 
employment relationships within specific political economy contexts, but are incapable of 
eliminating ‘structured antagonism’ and labour process power imbalances, which may enable 
or constrain moral economies. This article applies Laaser’s (2016) framework to analyse moral 
economy unevenness in relation to a case context of strong collective worker solidarity, where 
‘structured antagonism’ surfaces more explicitly. 
Section two provides a condensed review of ‘moral economy’ and LPT, outlining some key 
prior research and explaining how our framework was applied originally by Laaser (2016). 
Section three introduces the case context, data and research methods. Section four presents the 
findings under four solidarity themes: 1) solidarity background, 2) solidarity constraints, 3) 
developing overt solidarity and 4) solidarity outcomes. Finally, section five summarizes how 
applying Laaser’s (2016) framework fusing Sayer’s ME (2000) with LPT (Thompson and 
Smith, 2010, 2017) enhances understanding of dialectical tensions regarding worker solidarity.  
The multi-layered moral economy  
Studying ‘moral economy’ (ME) involves examining ‘ways in which economic activities, in 
the broad sense, are influenced by moral-political norms and sentiments, and how, conversely, 
those norms are compromised by economic forces,’ (Sayer, 2000: 80). In general, ‘moral-
political norms and sentiments’ constitute ‘the responsibilities and rights of individuals and 
institutions with respect to others [and include] the needs and the ends of economic activity’ 
(Sayer, 2000: 79).  
Polanyi’s (1957, 1968) influential ME theory focusing on a late 19th century/early 20th century 
marketization wave, accentuates the destructive power of markets through commodifying three 
‘fictitious commodities’, land, money and labour. He observes a ‘double movement’, where 
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economic liberals pursue disembedded self-regulated economies, while oppositional social 
groups (e.g., unions, communes, co-operatives) aim to protect society and workers from market 
fundamentalism by underscoring moral and social obligations (Bolton et al., 2016; Gajewska, 
2013; Greco and Chiarello, 2014; Polanyi, 1957, 1968). 
Pivotal to this study and influenced by Polanyi (1957, 1968), is Sayer’s (2005, 2011, 2015) ME 
theory, stressing ‘lay morality’. Lay morality assumes that understanding how people act in 
real-life contexts involves stretching human motivations beyond pure self-interest and focusing 
on multiple needs, commitments, relationships, and how people should treat others. It posits 
that humans make normative evaluative judgements about how their own and others’ actions 
impact their own and others’ well-being. Sentient beings continuously monitor and evaluate 
what is good, bad, fair or unfair about particular situations and what to do for the best, by 
considering human capacity to flourish/suffer.  
Lay morality highlights dialectical relations where economic practices shape, but are 
simultaneously shaped by, human agency and lay morality (Laaser, 2016, Sayer, 2005). Lay 
morality and human agency are contested and enabled/constrained by power networks and 
other structural conditions (Bolton and Laaser, 2013; Sayer, 2000, 2011). Consequently, moral 
economies and norms, needs, values, ideas, commitments, relationships and behaviours they 
help define, constitute various social, political and ideological layers, potentially in tension and 
shaped, but not determined, by moral principles (Sayer, 2000). Even when economic/market 
relationships are enforced by politically-economically dominant social actors, this is never 
unanimous or ideologically hegemonic. Moral economies are sites of struggle and market rule 
is never total (McMurtry, 2013; Peck, 2013; Schröder, 2012).  
Sayer’s (2005, 2011, 2015) ME views employment as an economic, moral and social 
relationship, enmeshed in multiple networks of mutual reciprocity, power dynamics, political 
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tensions, ideologies, trust relations and social dependencies (Bolton et al., 2012; Fox, 1974; 
Khurana, 2017; Polanyi, 1957; Sayer, 2000, 2015; Umney, 2017). Sayer elucidates 
irreconcilable moral economy contradictions in capitalist organizations because capitalism’s 
raison d'être is accumulating profit, not meeting moral human needs. Workers are social beings 
whose physical, psychological, economic and cultural well-being depends on collective 
cooperation with others (Sayer, 2007, 2015; Sennett, 2013). Moreover, employees can pursue 
divergent concerns from employers, which sometimes clash with organizational goals. 
Workers may resist due to deficient material extrinsic goods such as pay and conditions, but 
also due to inadequate intangible intrinsic moral goods, such as dignity, recognition, autonomy 
and trust (Hodson, 2001; Sayer, 2007).  
 
Fusing Labour Process Theory and ME  
Labour process theory (LPT) (Thompson and Smith, 2009, 2010, 2017; Smith, 2016; 
Thompson and Newsome, 2016) can enhance lay morality’s capacity to analyse social relations 
of workplace struggle and the contradictions of conflict and cooperation. Contemporary LPT 
specifically captures workplace-based resistance at root-level and links it to broader political 
economy contextual forces associated with capital accumulation; including technology, 
financialization, dominant ideologies and globalization (Thompson and Smith, 2009, 2017). 
LPT views employment relationships as embedding an enduring ‘structured antagonism’ 
dynamic comprising unequal employer-employee dependence, with employees subordinate to 
employer authority and control (Edwards, 1990, 2018). Nevertheless, managers and employees 
persistently negotiate content, duration and price of embodied labour power. Open-ended 
effort-reward exchanges are characterized by intricate conflict-cooperation tensions and are 
subject to internal/external contextual pressures (Author A; Baldamus, 1961; Bélanger and 
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Edwards, 2013). In specific contexts and at certain times it may become more overt and visible 
to workers that they have collective concerns that differ from employers and capital. Hence, 
particular internal/external situational forces intertwine to activate pre-existing solidarity and 
stimulate overt collective struggles over the frontier of control (Goodrich, 1920). Social 
scientists can explicitly adopt ‘structured antagonism’ as an analytical starting/anchor concept 
to examine how embryonic solidarity within the labour process evolves and becomes more 
observable at different points in time, in specific contexts.  
Kelly’s (1998) Mobilization Theory discusses social processes, which help stress common 
worker preferences and activate pre-existing solidarity within the labour process. Mobilization 
Theory posits that union agency and ideologies significantly shape mobilization, by influencing 
workers’ evaluations of social categories they belong to (their social identity), and of ‘out-
groups’ (e.g., employers) (Darlington, 2018). Taylor and Moore (2015) underscore how union 
ideological frames promote collective resistance and challenge employer narratives during a 
British Airways dispute. However, employer power over the labour process can prevent 
collective resistance and intensify managerial control (Author A; Burawoy, 2013). 
Furthermore, Bélanger and Edwards (2013) explain how consumerist ideology increasingly 
influences the labour process. Manager and customer control are mutually reinforcing, often 
leaving workers torn between both parties’ demands and potentially eroding worker autonomy 
at the point of production/service delivery.   
Some LPT scholars implicitly apply ME to empirically analyse workplace solidarity (Fantasia, 
1988). Nonetheless, existing scholarship utilizing LPT to analyse workplace struggle and  
collective resistance has tended to downplay the complexity and significance of moral 
economy factors (Laaser, 2016; Sayer, 2000, 2015) in situations when employers/the state 
attempt to recalibrate the effort-reward bargain and shift the frontier of control in their favour.  
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Contemporary moral economy research 
ME has emerged in recent scholarship on economic and industrial democracy (Bolton and 
Laaser, 2013; Breslin and Wood, 2016; Darr, 2011; Khurana, 2017; Umney, 2017). Our 
empirical case study applies Laaser’s (2016) lay morality framework, which explicitly merges 
ME with LPT to explore conflictual employment relations in UK banks. Through this 
pioneering theoretical integration, Laaser (2016) connects changing manager-employee 
relationships after performance management systems (PMS) implementation, to broader 
political economy forces, while maintaining a focus on individuals as sentient and social beings 
with complex needs and concerns.  
Laaser (2016) explains how the labour process in bank work during the pre-PMS regime 
constituted shared moral understandings between managers and workers who respected each 
other as reflexive lay moral actors; while simultaneously embedding more covert conflict 
through patriarchal workplace relations. He cogently shows how work intensification and 
tighter control regimes after PMS implementation degraded and commodified the labour 
process in-line with broader employment relationship marketization. This eroded shared moral 
understandings and provoked more hostile employee-manager relationships. Laaser’s (2016) 
framework therefore captures the uneven and uncertain nature of moral economies. It enables 
us to appreciate the necessity of examining moral economy factors in work and employment 
relationships, while recognizing that uneven lay morality and unstable moral understandings 
inevitably operate within a structurally asymmetrical labour process and broader political 
economy constraints.   
Relatedly, Laaser’s (2016) framework encourages us to theorize manager-employee conflict 
not only as clashing concerns, but also as disconnected moral understandings. The concept of 
 8 
 
human and moral ‘(dis)connection’ is highly pertinent, because it does not overlook potential 
for shared moral understandings and social compromise between employees and managers. 
Indeed, Laaser (2016) discusses traces of re-connection between bank managers and bank 
workers after PMS implementation. Yet, equally, ‘(dis)connection’ highlights the enduring 
fragility of shared moral understandings and human connections within uncertain political 
economy conditions. Analysing collective workplace struggle over organizational re-
structuring in the Irish public transport sector, this article applies Laaser’s (2016) framework 
to examine how moral (dis)connections and shared understandings between workers and 
employers, but also between co-workers and between workers and passengers, shape moral 
economies and worker solidarity.  
Further empirical research is required in different country and sector contexts, which apply 
Laaser’s (2016) framework and merge LPT with ME to fully capture the unevenness of moral 
economies and the contested nature of collective union resistance and worker solidarity. Some 
other recent studies have focused on moral economy, but do not explicitly combine ME with 
LPT as Laaser (2016) comprehensively does. For example, Bolton and Laaser (2013) provide 
valuable theoretical insight into Sayer’s (2006, 2015) and Polanyi’s (1957, 1968) ME theories, 
underscoring ‘lay morality’. Combining ME with realist documentary analysis, Bolton et al. 
(2016) explore tensions between labour commodification and human flourishing in European 
employment policy. Umney (2017) examines freelancers’ moral economy in increasingly 
competitive creative industry. Furthermore, Bailey et al. (2012) explain how Australian 
regulatory changes impact precarious workers’ moral economy.  
Some ME studies touch upon worker resistance. Breslin and Wood (2016) uncover rule-
breaking and informal norms underpinning professional carers’ moral economy. Mulinari 
(2019) identifies a ‘tipping’ moral economy, which entailed non-union restaurant workers 
collectively resisting by sharing tips. Moreover, examining female construction workers’ moral 
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economy, Khurana (2017) observes that worker-contractor social ties prevent overt resistance, 
but co-worker relations occasionally fuel non-union collective protest. Darr (2011) touches 
upon IT sales workers’ resistance, underpinned by moral values.  
This section has reviewed moral economy, LPT, and existing ME empirical studies. This article 
contributes to knowledge by applying Laaser’s (2016) framework combining Sayer’s (2006, 
2015) ‘lay morality’ with LPT (Smith, 2016; Thompson and Smith, 2009, 2010, 2017) to 
examine collective worker solidarity. Laaser’s (2016) approach demonstrates that lay morality 
offers valuable theorization of how human capacity to reflect on and evaluate their own and 
others’ well-being intertwines with political, social and ideological ME layers to unpredictably 
impact human agency, shared moral understandings and human connections. LPT can 
contextualize these ideas in specific workplace-based solidarity settings and material struggles, 
by conceptualizing solidarity as social relations expressing the inherent collective nature of the 
labour process. The next section outlines the research methodology. 
 
Research Methodology  
Case context 
This article utilises a qualitative case study of a dispute over state-driven competitive tendering 
and marketization at BusCo between November 2013 and May 2015. To maintain 
confidentially, pseudonyms are used for respondents, unions, the organization and the relevant 
state-body.  
BusCo, located in the Republic of Ireland capital of Dublin, operates within the Greater Dublin 
area and employs approximately 3,500 employees, including driver, maintenance, 
administrative, managerial and executive grades. It is part of the larger state-owned Irish 
Transport Group (ITG). In 2013, the Irish Transport Regulator (ITR) (a new state body formed 
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in 2009) proposed to competitively tender twenty-three BusCo routes. The plans were strongly 
opposed by BusCo drivers and their two rival unions, UnionA and UnionB. Consciously 
mobilized collective resistance involved campaigns, lobbying, a 48-hour strike in May 2015, 
and two deferred strikes. Representing public transport workers nationally, UnionA and 
UnionB possess significant disruptive and political power in this sector. Furthermore, very high 
membership density renders economic resources to organize strike action, mobilize campaigns, 
communicate with members, and fund strike pay. UnionB (a specific bus and rail union) is 
significantly smaller than UnionA (Ireland’s largest general, union).  
The Republic of Ireland provides a fitting case-study context because the findings illustrate 
how country-level systemic forces shaped uneven and contested worker solidarity against state 
driven restructuring. This took place against the background of  the collapse of Ireland’s 
national social partnership model in 2009 (McDonough and Dundon, 2010; Roche, 2009; 
Roche and Gormley, 2017), the 2008 financial crash, ensuing crisis of capital accumulation 
and assertion of neoliberalism and marketization (Author B; O’Riain, 2014). Moreover, this 
specific political-economy context captures how moral economies shape struggles extending 
beyond specific labour processes by spilling over to other workplaces and ‘public realms’. 
Finally, where solidarity is present, our empirical case demonstrates potential worker capacity 
to secure concessions when contesting market mechanisms and state attempts to shift the 
frontier of control. The case emphasises major constraints and challenges unions/workers face 
during this process.  
 
Methods 
Studies rooted in positivism and quantitative number-crunching often obscure contextual 
richness of data by omitting political-moral dimensions shaping real life human agency, 
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including lay morality and social relationships (Sayer, 2005, 2007). Likewise, such studies 
often fail to reveal how contested and unequal employment relationships, intermeshed with 
political economy forces, enable/constrain collective worker agency (Godard, 2014). 
Uncertainties and ambiguities characterizing workers’ moral economies, labour power 
indeterminacy and ‘structured antagonism’ are best captured by context sensitive qualitative 
methods (Burawoy, 2013). 
The article applies triangulated qualitative methods to probe how workers’ fluid moral 
economy shaped union solidary during the dispute. Semi-structured interviews lasting 30-90 
minutes occurred in seven BusCo garages and two union headquarters between January and 
August 2017. Interviews with UnionA members included two union national executive 
members, two union officials, two other UnionA employees, and fifteen workplace 
representatives. Interviews with UnionB members included two union national executive 
members, fifteen workplace representatives, and one former workplace representative. Shorter 
interviews were also conducted with ten lay members from both unions. Potential respondents 
were contacted using on-line publically available contact details (e-mails, phone numbers). A 
snowball approach was then applied where interviewees (acting as gate-keepers) provided 
contact information for other respondents.  
Observation was organized through gatekeepers and an ethnographic diary was kept. Visiting 
bus garages offered rich ethnographic visual data of the labour process and representative/ 
member relationships. Attending representative meetings in both union headquarters revealed 
various company and garage level issues, including UnionA-UnionB rivalry. Finally, 
observing drivers at work furnished invaluable ethnographic insights into labour processes and 
job demands (Burawoy, 2013). How driver-passenger interactions (positive and negative) and 
environmental factors (e.g., traffic) shape the labour process were noted, varying across routes 
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and time. Moreover, observing high passenger demand for BusCo services illuminated 
potential driver/union industrial power.  
Extensive documentary material, including union press releases and collective agreements, was 
also analysed. A realist data analysis approach was adopted (see Bolton et al., 2016; Edwards, 
2018). Realists explore ‘the cause of something’. Analysis involved oscillating iteratively 
between interview transcripts, documents and ethnographic notes, to identify prominent 
contextual forces shaping uneven and changeable worker solidarity. Moral, political, 
ideological and social layers of drivers’ inconsistent moral economy were fused with evidence 
of deeply-ingrained labour process tensions situated within a broader political economy 
context, to produce four interrelated solidarity themes.  
Findings  
By applying Laaser’s (2016) framework integrating ME analysis with LPT, this section 
unpacks how BusCo drivers’ moral economy shaped union attempts to foment common worker 
concerns, foreground divergent state-company-worker preferences and activate more overt 
workplace solidarity, during a dispute over state driven competitive tendering in Ireland. 
Unevenness and complexity of drivers’ moral economy and the collective resistance it shaped 
are captured by four solidarity themes: 1) solidarity background 2) solidarity constraints 3) 
developing overt solidarity and 4) solidarity outcomes.  
Solidarity background   
Changes in Ireland’s political economy context have shaped the background for worker (union) 
solidarity at BusCo. In 2000, politicians, particularly from the smaller neoliberalist coalition 
party at the time, the right-wing Progressive Democrats (PD), sought to privatize BusCo 
services, challenging drivers’ shared moral understandings and public-service values. 
However, this was constrained by a centralised national social partnership tripartite pact 
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between employers, government, and unions, which had existed in Ireland since 1987. A 
UnionA representative emphasised that proposals to reform public transport had to be 
deliberated through social partnership:  
Because of social partnership, a widespread consensus existed that government had 
responsibility to discuss the proposals in a formal partnership transport forum. (George, 
UnionA representative) 
The consensus ideology of social partnership foregrounded moral ideas about collaborative 
mutuality and deliberative and democratic power sharing; yet, in reality, the Irish version 
embedded neoliberal contradictions and was contested. Social partnership institutionalized 
workplace conflict and moderated wage growth, which encountered scepticism from powerful 
unions, such as UnionB:  
The feeling of having to struggle for wage increases and build solidarity wasn’t the same under 
social partnership. Plus, we had power and resources to win more control over wages under 
free collective bargaining. (Cameron, UnionB representative) 
Notwithstanding, because social partnership was widely perceived as essential for industrial 
relations stability it generated a degree of social compromise and shared moral understandings 
between government, employers and unions. Right-wing politicians pursuing a market 
liberalization agenda threatened social and moral connections between government and unions, 
and therefore lacked political and ideological resources to legitimize BusCo privatization. 
Taoiseach Bertie Ahern was a staunch social partnership advocate, who, as then Minister for 
Labour, instigated tripartite arrangements between his Fianna Fáil party, unions and employers 
during the mid-1980s, along with then Taoiseach Charles Haughey.  
Nevertheless, the BusCo restructuring struggle re-surfaced in 2002 when then Minister for 
Transport Séamus Brennan proposed to privatize BusCo:  
A major national transport strike involving all ITG companies and Aer Rianta [Dublin Airport] 
was organized in 2004 to resist Brennan’s plans. (John, UnionA representative)  
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However, UnionA’s leadership rescinded the strike after Ahern committed to discussions. This 
ignited fury from union grassroots; but it may be that UnionA’s leadership predicted Brennan’s 
plans would fail given the depth of Ahern’s and Fianna Fáil’s political support for social 
partnership. Brennan also lacked political/ideological legitimacy to rupture the degree of social 
compromise fostered between unions and government through social partnership; and a cabinet 
reshuffle occurred shortly afterwards.  
The period from 2003 to 2007 constituted the apex of the so-called ‘Celtic Tiger’ economic 
boom, with significant growth in Ireland and BusCo itself, putting restructuring proposals in 
abeyance. Nevertheless, ‘moral’ social partnership contradictions endured. Despite 
unprecedented economic growth, broader social inequality remained. Wage restraint, rising 
living costs and a property bubble increased indebtedness as many people borrowed beyond 
their means. This bubble eventually burst, culminating in the 2008 financial crisis. The 2008 
crisis and subsequent recession hit BusCo (and the country) hard.  
Ahern resigned as Taoiseach in April 2008. His successor Brian Cowen was less committed to 
generating shared moral understandings and social compromise with unions through social 
partnership, which was now seen as a tainted brand by many. Tensions underpinning 
collaborative mutuality surfaced intensely when unions strongly opposed the Cowen 
government’s austerity measures and public-sector wage cuts, forced upon Irish workers by the 
external ‘troika’ of the EU-IMF-ECB to offset the failures of a broken banking system. 
Moreover, the Department of Finance, which contested trade union influence over an elected 
government’s policies, re-gained economic policy control from the Department of the 
Taoiseach. The fragile contradictions of (voluntarist) social partnership culminated in its 
breakdown in 2009, repositioning state preferences more definitively towards neoliberalism 
and marketization. Respondents claimed that the breakdown of social partnership highlighted 
its weak foundations and diverse moral understandings between parties:  
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 ‘Real’ social partnership, wouldn’t have broken down. (Steven, UnionA representative) 
Following the Cowen government’s ‘rationalization’ strategy and review of state bodies in 
2008, the Irish Transport Regulator (ITR) was established in 2009 to oversee regulation and 
financing of public transport services, including BusCo. In November 2013, under a new Fine 
Gael-Labour (centre-right-centre-left) coalition, the ITR proposed to competitively tender 
twenty-three BusCo routes. This indicated the weakening bonds of social compromise between 
government and unions and the erosion of previously shared moral understandings enabling 
BusCo to operate as a public service monopoly.  
Solidarity constraints  
BusCo unions experienced various challenges when seeking to activate more observable 
solidarity. Drivers discussed how changes within the labour process potentially constrained 
moral and social co-worker connections and obscured mutual worker preferences. Removing 
conductors between the mid-1960s and late 1980s fractured and individualized the driver 
community.  
Driver and conductor pairs developed strong bonds. Many arrived in depots early to chat before 
shifts, some spent more time together than with family. (Cliff, UnionB representative) 
Drivers also spent less time in garages interacting with co-workers because, as observing 
drivers on shift illustrated, new technology, together with BusCo strategies to improve 
operational efficiency and meet consumer-orientated ‘convenience’ demands, meant that 
passengers overwhelmingly used electronic payment. Consequently, drivers no longer visited 
garages after their shift with cash fares or machine readings.  
Distinct garage cultures, observed during garage visits and union meetings and reinforced by 
garage-level agreements, potentially concealed shared concerns and moral understandings 
between drivers in different garages, thereby constraining work-group consciousness and 
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human connections. Elements of garage competition existed, further fuelled by sport 
competitions (e.g., football and golf). Drivers rarely interacted with other garage drivers on 
shift, not even at canteens:  
In the main canteen in Dublin centre, depots have their own seating areas, people usually keep 
to those areas. (Gavin, UnionA representative) 
Within garages, different sub-cultures, diverse worker preferences, needs and commitments 
moulded attitudes towards union activity and colleagues. For instance, economic sacrifices 
regarding strike action potentially undercut collectivism, particularly with below inflation 
wage increases and rising living costs; notably since the 2008 financial crisis. Moreover, 
although the 1997 Working Time Act was designed to protect employee well-being by reducing 
long working hours, it also reduced driver earning potential (via overtime) and morale:  
It disadvantaged us. Many drivers earned high incomes from overtime. Some finished work at 
12am and started again at 4am. (Will, driver) 
Furthermore, during the tendering dispute, tendering twenty-three BusCo routes affected 
drivers/garages to different extents, thereby obscuring mutual driver concerns, shared 
understandings and divergent state-company-worker preferences.  
Importantly, members experienced diminished union power over time and increased 
managerial control due to intensified neoliberalism and marketization, which potentially 
curbed driver confidence and inhibited collective solidarity activation. Additionally, drivers 
originally collected cash wages from garages on Thursdays, which became ‘union’ day, as it 
furnished union representatives with opportunities to mobilize members, cement their mutual 
concerns and develop human and moral connections. However, as witnessed during garage 
visits, electronic wage transfer meant that Thursdays were now relatively quiet, with only larger 
garages remaining relatively busy.  
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Observations revealed that garage-level union relations varied dramatically and often reflected 
dynamic fusions of representative personalities, specific day-to-day garage issues and garage 
manager styles. Moreover, deeply ingrained historical UnionA-UnionB rivalry also potentially 
overshadowed divergent state-worker concerns and weakened morale and social driver ties:  
 UnionA-UnionB rivalry goes back to the 1960s, UnionB is a break-away from UnionA. (Mike, 
driver)  
 UnionA represents roughly 1,200 drivers and UnionB around 1,300, and there was frequent 
switching of membership between the two unions, which also created some hostility. 
Furthermore, although both unions shared a commitment to protect employee well-being, their 
values and identities were in tension:   
Both unions’ traditions are alien, jet black and pure white. For example, we’re not affiliated to 
Labour nor to the ICTU, UnionA is a general union, we’re a specialised bus and rail union. 
(Craig, UnionB official) 
Developing overt solidarity 
Employees  
Regular member communication was critical to overcome potential solidarity constraints 
discussed above, actively build morale and social worker connections and highlight divergent 
state-company-worker concerns. Unions communicated a collective ideology that encapsulated 
and articulated workers’ overall preferences and shared understandings, including those not 
working on routes at risk, through face-to-face interaction, social media, e-mails and telephone 
conversations. Furthermore, because driver reflections on other frontier of control struggles 
shaped member-representative moral connections and union legitimacy among members, 
representatives juggled mobilizing drivers over tendering proposals with resolving other 
diverse day-to-day workplace issues around the effort-reward bargain.  
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Contesting the ITR’s narrative to reveal disconnections between worker-state preferences and 
moral understandings was a crucial ideological component. While the ITR argued that only 
twenty-three BusCo routes were being tendered, unions warned that partial BusCo privatization 
was most likely a temporary strategy (a possible staging-post for full privatization) and that 
BusCo could face millions in legacy costs if they lost routes. Union counter-arguments were 
reinforced by member evaluations of other privatized Irish companies (e.g., Dublin bin 
collection, Air Lingus, Irish Ferries) and individual concerns about the future of BusCo and 
working conditions.  
Union ideology emphasized workers’ shared social identities as ‘BusCo drivers’, ‘trade union 
members’ and ‘public-sector’ workers, and constructed them as distinct to the ITR. This 
prompted driver reflections on the ‘supporting co-workers’ workplace norm, which had 
previously combined with union disruptive/political/economic power to secure some driver 
control over individual, garage and company issues. Drivers evaluated that ‘strike-breaking’ 
would violate shared driver understandings and threaten informal co-worker ties. Members 
reflected on how fulfilling normative co-worker commitments produced moral sentiments of 
pride and self-respect. Moreover, garage visits illuminated co-worker interdependence; for 
instance, to swap shifts/holidays and offer advice around work/personal matters. This helped 
justify the economic sacrifice of striking, generate social and moral co-worker connections and 
create a sense of ‘collective’ solidarity, rather than ‘individual’ sacrifice. Union economic 
resources to provide strike pay also helped. 
Unions also developed more overt collective solidarity by emphasizing members’ shared ‘not-
for-profit’ ideas, public-sector values and concerns that tendering would shift drivers’ social 
identities from ‘public service workers’ to ‘private-sector workers’. Reflecting on past 
experiences as private bus drivers, discussions with family, friends, colleagues, and union 
discourse, members assessed that employees were instrumentalized as profit generators to a 
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greater extent in private-sector companies, impeding human connection and worker well-
being:  
It’s definitely not perfect here, but we get much better working conditions than in private 
companies and we’re valued more. (Mark, UnionB representative) 
De-humanized private-sector employment relationships were perceived as denying human 
flourishing and violating drivers’ shared moral understandings by eroding pay, pensions, 
holidays, union representation, employer-employee reciprocity, autonomy, recognition and 
dignity:  
I have family commitments. You could be working all types of shifts in private companies… 
and be on low-pay. (Dwain, driver) 
The ITR argued that if BusCo lost routes and workers transferred to a private operator, drivers 
would be protected under Transfer of Undertakings regulations (TUPE). Union counter-
arguments, combined with driver lay evaluations of TUPE effects in other workplaces (such as 
Greyhound recycling), convinced members that TUPE was too weak to protect employees from 
possible managerial abuse and defend their interests in an unequal employment relationship.  
A key union/driver concern was that because private-sector workers often lack strong union 
representation, they cannot fully utilize labour power indeterminacy to challenge exploitative 
managerial control, promote worker well-being and persuade employers to foster moral 
connections and social compromise with workers. This severely contradicted drivers’ shared 
‘industrial democracy’ ideals and mutual preferences to extend workers’ democratic control 
over the workplace. Members shared moral concerns that without unions to collectively 
mobilize and voice grievances, workers would be extremely vulnerable to attack in private 
companies and divergent employer-worker concerns would be eclipsed:  
We’re heard about as a company because we have unions that fight for us. (Kyle, driver)  
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As discussed, union ability to contest the frontier of control at BusCo and activate more visible 
collective solidarity was potentially inhibited by intense UnionA-UnionB rivalry. However, 
although this may have surfaced regarding concurrent day-to-day issues, UnionA-UnionB 
relations remained relatively stable during the tendering dispute, encouraging solidarity. This 
was largely due to union awareness that divisions between unions would feed ITR control, limit 
social and moral driver connections and constrain collective resistance to proposals that had 
significant implications for not only employees and passengers, but also for union power 
overall. Unions emphasized the difficulty of securing union recognition in private companies, 
in the absence of supporting national statutory recognition legislation. Employee transfers to 
private companies could decrease union membership and harm their economic, ideological and 
political power, a particular threat to the smaller UnionB. Furthermore, union failure to secure 
substantive concessions may have broader implications, by increasing state 
political/ideological power to privatize other organizations and encouraging ‘a race to the 
bottom in pay and conditions for workers’ (UnionB press release) throughout the transport 
industry:  
This was a major state affair, with significant potential implications for us as unions too, we 
had to go in together. (Craig, UnionB official) 
Passengers 
Unions also developed more overt collective solidarity by stressing drivers’ shared moral 
understandings around ‘serving passenger needs’, rather than ‘meeting customer demands’. 
When observing drivers in Ireland’s busy capital city, constant driver-passenger interaction 
was evident. Union members felt morally disconnected from profit-seeking private operators 
who would transform ‘passengers’ into ‘customers’. Members predicted a drive to remove 
unprofitable routes, even though passengers need them (particularly the elderly). Drivers also 
envisaged routes being restructured to prioritize busier main roads over ring roads, enhancing 
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cost-efficiency, but increasing danger for elderly passengers and children. Moreover, workers 
feared the abolition of senior citizen free-travel to enhance profit. Lower bus fleet quality in 
private companies was another shared moral concern, risking safety. Driver lay evaluations 
were mediated by individual experiences of privatized services, social interaction with friends, 
co-workers and representatives, union discourse and commitments to informal ties built with 
passengers:   
You wait a bit for them at the stop if they’re not there. (Adrian, UnionA representative)  
I’ve got an agreement with a regular passenger that when we go on holiday, we bring each other 
back a present. (Cliff, UnionB representative).  
Drivers characterized social and moral connections with passengers as benefiting driver well-
being by breaking driving monotony and explained that receiving recognition as people, not 
just ‘bus drivers’, evoked moral sentiments of dignity and self-respect. Notwithstanding, 
researchers witnessed difficult disconnected relations between drivers and passengers, and met 
a recently assaulted driver. Moreover, they explained how dominant consumerist ideology 
shaped their labour process, and made driver-passenger relations more challenging; for 
example through stricter passenger complaint procedures. However, more observable 
solidarity was encouraged by shared ‘anti-consumerism’ ideas and union member evaluations 
that in private-sector employment relationships (where ‘customers’ significantly impacted 
profit generation), ‘consumerism’ and ‘customer demands’ rhetoric permeated deeply, 
potentially eroding social compromise and shared moral understandings between managers and 
workers and increasing managerial control.  
To challenge the ITR’s ideological discourse and highlight shared understandings between 
unions, workers and society, unions contested ‘value for money’ and ‘service quality’ rhetoric, 
arguing that tendering ‘will be a bad deal for the citizen and tax payer’ (UnionA press release). 
UK bus privatization was often mentioned to frame counter-arguments:  
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UK bus privatization has been a disaster, tax-payers are paying more and more and service 
quality is poor.  (Stuart, UnionA representative) 
Overall, driver strike action received strong public support and drivers reflected on passengers 
who wished them ‘good luck’. This demonstrated moral driver-passenger connections and 
strengthened union counter-narratives, while threatening the ITR’s political/ideological 
legitimacy. However, some passengers had different moral understandings and engaged in 
depersonalized economic exchange relationships with drivers, with the sole purpose of 
fulfilling consumer demands (i.e., providing transport from A to B without disruption). 
Moreover, some passengers did not share not-for-profit ideas and absorbed hegemonic cost-
efficiency and value for money rhetoric anchoring the tendering narrative. 
  
Furthermore, political/ideological union resources were challenged by private operators 
sharing competing moral understandings. Private operators sought to secure 
ideological/political legitimacy and enhance their economic resources, by arguing that the 
government was acting immorally by distributing routes unfairly. Under political/economic 
pressure to articulate members’ interests, a private operator representative body suggested 
tendering more routes:  
The current proposals are a step forward; however the proposal to limit competitive tendering 
to such a small proportion of the market until end-2019 at the earliest is not sufficiently far 
reaching. (Coach Tourism & Transport Council report) 
Solidarity outcomes  
Unions lobbied and campaigned against the ITR’s decision to tender bus routes, but could not 
strike directly over this issue, because political strikes are illegal under the Industrial Relations 
Act 1990. This was a significant challenge unions had to overcome by developing a narrative 
which fully encapsulated drivers’ shared anti-tendering ideas and moral understandings, while 
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legitimatizing strike action and avoiding fines. Unions assessed that they could legally strike 
over ‘the security of bus drivers’ terms and conditions of employment as well as the long-term 
future of public bus services’ (UnionA press release), ‘in the event that common sense does 
not prevail and it were to proceed’ (UnionA newspaper). BusCo and the ITR still argued that 
this was a political dispute, but unions maintained their narrative (relatively solidaristic union 
relations at this time helped) and a 48 hour strike occurred in May 2015.  
Further strike action was suspended after substantive concessions were secured. For example, 
a degree of social compromise between unions, management and government was fostered by 
a new legally binding Registered Employment Agreement (REA) established in the Labour 
Court, stipulating that:   
 No employee will have to transfer on a compulsory basis to another operator…  
…any legacy cost, if any, which may arise from the tendering of bus services will not be borne 
by the employees [of BusCo]…..  
a performance regime whereby performance deductions/proportionate penalties will apply to 
payments to the contractor in the event of breaches of employment related contract obligations 
and could lead to the potential cessation of any such contracts awarded. 
The REA also protected:  
the existing terms and conditions (including pensions) for any staff that choose to transfer to 
any new operator. (Labour Relations Commission ‘Terms of Settlement’ document) 
This was important because despite drivers’ widely shared public-sector values, drivers’ 
concerns, needs and commitments were variable:  
There may be a small minority wanting to transfer. The shifts may suit them better, or they may 
seek part-time work, employee situations change. (David, UnionA representative) 
Sectoral Employment Orders (SEOs) introduced in The Industrial Relations Amendment Act 
(IRAA) 2015 stipulated industry-level legally enforceable working conditions and pay. REAs 
had industry-level remit before being deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2013. 
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The 2015 IRAA re-introduced REAs. Unions achieved assurances from BusCo management 
that they would jointly seek a SEO to benefit both parties, indicating a degree of shared 
preferences and moral understandings. However, respondents mentioned potential barriers. For 
instance, given financial accumulation imperatives (e.g., shareholders), external pressures 
(e.g., competition) and foreseeing their economic resources threatened, ‘private operators 
would definitely resist’ (Peter, driver). 
Finally, unions secured concessions from the Minister and the ITR, who promised to refrain 
from implementing full BusCo privatization. Given that tendering could not be wholly 
prevented, union communications with drivers stressing the implications of the concessions for 
their common labour process preferences and shared moral understandings were imperative. 
Nevertheless, struggle over the frontier of control at BusCo continued. Unions engaged with 
BusCo driver roster and garage displacement issues after a UK-based contractor secured the 
tendering contract and commenced services in late 2018. Furthermore, given Ireland’s 
increasingly neo-liberalized political economy, any social and moral connections between 
unions, government and managers are fragile and unions feared that concessions may be 
reneged on; particularly regarding full BusCo privatization.  
This section has applied Laaser’s (2016) framework combining ME with LPT to examine how 
overt collective resistance was activated during a state-driven tendering dispute. The evidence 
illustrates the changeable and multi-layered nature of drivers’ moral economy and the solidarity 
it incubated, in response to the ITR’s attempts to shift the frontier of control.  
 
Discussion  
This article adds contextual nuance and empirical detail to solidarity and moral economy 
scholarship by applying Laaser’s (2016) framework integrating Sayer’s (2005, 2011, 2015)  
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‘lay morality’ with labour process theory (LPT)/structured antagonism (Edwards, 1990, 2018; 
Smith, 2016; Thompson and Smith, 2009, 2010, 2017); and a realist analysis (Bolton et al., 
2016; Edwards, 2018). It captures how dynamic collective union solidarity was activated and 
constrained during workplace conflict in an Irish public transport company, BusCo, and offers 
two interrelated contributions outlined below.  
First, the article demonstrates the dialectics of how ‘structured antagonism’ (Edwards, 1990, 
2018) within the labour process fused with lay morality, social relationships, commitments, 
shared ideas and union/representative agency, while being further enabled or inhibited by 
contextual political economy forces, to activate more overt collective solidarity.  
Adding a new empirical contribution by applying Laaser’s (2016) framework, this article 
encourages social scientists examining collective solidarity and industrial democracy to 
examine how unstable moral economies (Sayer, 2005, 2011, 2015) and their variable moral, 
political, social and ideological dimensions shape worker mobilization during workplace 
struggle over the frontier of control (Goodrich, 1920). Applying Laaser’s (2016) framework 
reveals that collective conflict at BusCo not only reflected materialist structured antagonism 
within the employment relationship, but also disconnected moral understandings between 
drivers, their employer and the state around the nature and meaning of work and how 
employees and employers should treat each other. Our article illustrates how Laaser’s (2016) 
framework can also examine human and moral connections between workers and between 
workers and passengers.  
In line with ME and LPT analysis, BusCo driver agency was shaped by state 
preferences/policies (Sayer, 2000; Thompson and Smith, 2009). The national-level social 
partnership model present in Ireland between 1987 and 2009 was ideologically packaged as a 
moral, consensus-oriented tripartite power-sharing pact. In reality, however, it was contested 
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and in tension with burgeoning neo-liberalizing forces (Author B; McDonough and Dundon, 
2010). Notwithstanding, for a time, social partnership partially prevented BusCo privatization 
and generated a degree of shared, but nonetheless fragile, moral understandings and social 
compromise between government, employers and unions, including BusCo management and 
BusCo unions. Social partnership collapsed in late 2009 after the 2008 financial crisis, which 
led to subsequent assertion and acceleration of neoliberalism, followed by economic recession 
and politically imposed austerity on the public (Author B; McDonough and Dundon, 2010; 
O’Riain, 2014; Roche, 2009; Roche and Gormley, 2017). The BusCo tendering proposals in 
2013 fermented more disconnected moral understandings between the government, BusCo 
workers and unions; and the unravelling of compromise fostered by social partnership.  
Exemplifying LPT’s primary focus on workplace control dialectics (Taylor and Moore, 2015; 
Thompson and Smith, 2010, 2017), BusCo drivers’ specific labour process has been shaped 
over time by multiple forces, including technological change, and dominant neoliberal and 
consumerist ideologies; which threaten to erode union power. These, together with unique 
garage cultures, diverse individual concerns and union rivalry, potentially curbed moral co-
worker connections, concealed common driver preferences and limited worker solidarity. 
Nonetheless, overt collective solidarity was cemented by member lay evaluations of their 
common ‘BusCo driver’, ‘public-sector worker’ and ‘trade union member’ social identities, 
which unions helped construct and mobilize (Marks and Thompson, 2010). Less visible 
discursive struggle occurred between the ITR’s market ideology and union public service 
ideology; which powerfully structured and collectivised drivers’ concerns, lay evaluations and 
shared moral understandings. Union ideology reinforced member reflections on the ‘supporting 
co-workers’ workplace norm and generated moral co-worker connections (Hodder and 
Edwards, 2015). Drivers valued and depended on dignity, recognition, trust, reciprocity, and 
help extended by colleagues (Hodson, 2001; Sayer, 2007, 2016).  
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Private bus operators were perceived as heralding more exploitative and de-humanizing 
relationships than public sector BusCo. A key solidaristic collective concern among union 
members was that private sector employees often lack union representation to challenge 
inherently more powerful employers, emphasize common worker concerns and enable human 
flourishing. This can intensify managerial domination of the frontier of control, significantly 
limit potential for ‘genuine’ workplace co-operation/social compromise and obscure divergent 
preferences and observable conflict, as employers use ideological resources to manufacture 
consent and conceal power imbalances (Burawoy, 2013; Fox, 1974; Gramsci, 1971).  
Unions also stressed members’ shared moral understandings about tendering implications for 
passengers, mediated by driver reflections on informal ties and social connections with them 
(Breslin and Wood, 2016). However, as profit-driven employers and extrinsically 
instrumentalized employees are pressurized to meet heightened customer service-user 
expectations, workplace control regimes may intensify, limiting moral worker-manager 
connections and social compromise (Bélanger and Edwards, 2013). Significantly, public 
support was relatively strong during the BusCo dispute, constraining the ITR’s ideological 
legitimacy, despite negative discourse on bus strikes in some media. Union ideology sought to 
strengthen moral connections between co-workers and between workers and passengers by 
framing worker solidarity as having broader implications beyond organizational-level; namely 
buses as a vital public transport service and ‘public good’ (Sayer, 2000). Unions/drivers feared 
that in a neoliberal political economy context of competition and marketization, tendering 
could threaten the effort-reward bargain of all transport workers, and enhance state power to 
implement further privatization at BusCo and elsewhere. Despite their conflicting union 
identities (Hodder and Edwards, 2015), relatively cooperative union relations during the 
tendering dispute helped BusCo unions project a coherent narrative, attain unity around 
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common worker preferences and shared moral understandings, sustain member solidarity and 
legitimize industrial action. 
The case study demonstrates potential for ‘social compromise’ between the state, company 
management and workers (e.g., through the Registered Employment Agreement). However, 
worker solidarity and moral (re)connections are fragile in Ireland’s neo-liberal political 
economy, particularly since the 2008 financial crisis (McDonough and Dundon, 2010; O’Riain, 
2014). Struggles over marketization will likely continue. Neoliberal hegemony is never total, 
leaving terrain for contestation (McMurtry, 2013; Peck, 2013).  
The second related contribution relates to advancing ME research (Bailey et al., 2012; Bolton 
and Laaser, 2013; Bolton et al., 2016; Breslin and Wood, 2016; Khurana, 2017; Laaser, 2016; 
Mulinari, 2019; Umney, 2017). Our article does so by applying Laaser’s (2016) framework to 
critically examine unionized workers’ contested and shifting moral economy during workplace 
struggle over tendering, and by empirically demonstrating how LPT’s workplace/employment 
relationship-focused materialist analysis supplements ME in this context. Specifically, 
Laaser’s (2016) important study combines ME and LPT in the context of UK banks. However, 
collective solidarity and surfacing of open conflict was more evident at strongly unionized 
BusCo in the Irish public transport sector than in Laaser’s study. Therefore, our novel empirical 
contribution builds on the foundations set by Laaser.  
Laaser (2016) explains that moral understandings cannot eradicate structured antagonism and 
labour process power imbalances (which are inherent to employment relationships), but are 
meaningful attempts to humanize social relations in particular political economy contexts. 
Uniquely, we bring ME and LPT concepts together to explicitly underscore how ‘structured 
antagonism’ within the labour process shapes social and moral connections between multiple 
actors during collective workplace struggle.  
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Advancing knowledge about unionized workers’ moral economies and the collective 
solidarities they shape in different country and sector contexts provides greater understanding 
of the complex, uneven and contested reality of moral economies and collective worker 
solidarity. Moreover, despite their power having waned considerably since the 1970s, unions 
remain vitally important collective institutions to challenge market fundamentalism and 
managerial control. Additional empirical studies are required which apply Laaser’s (2016) 
framework to examine how workers engage with lay morality in other contexts of solidarity 
and struggle, in order to stimulate future debates about the role of moral economies in 
enhancing the quality of working life, humanizing antagonistic employment relationships 
under capitalism and extending workers’ democratic control.  
 
Conclusion  
This article enhances understanding of how the moral economy intersects with the labour 
process to shape collective solidarity at work. Our article contributes to Moral Economy (ME) 
and Labour Process Theory (LPT) scholarship by illustrating how LPT can buttress ME by 
offering a specific materialist employment relationship framework, which connects ‘structured 
antagonism’ at work to macro forces in the wider circuit of capital(ism). Combining lay 
morality with LPT offers a deeper fine-grained and multi-layered analysis of collective 
workplace solidarity and related tensions and struggles over the frontier of control in the 
context of wider political economy forces. Our research adds a new empirical contribution by 
applying Laaser’s (2016) pioneering theoretical framework to analyse how BusCo drivers’ 
uneven and fragile moral economy shaped contested union solidarity during workplace struggle 
over state driven tendering and marketization in Ireland’s public transport sector. When 
dominant neoliberal forces threaten collective agency and consolidate managerial control, 
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unpacking worker solidarity unevenness and complexity is important. This can help identify 
solidarity constraints and potential ways to (at least) partly mitigate their effects. We urge other 
scholars examining collective solidarity and industrial democracy to broaden their research 
agenda by focusing on how interwoven moral, political, social and ideological dimensions 
underpinning workers’ moral economies shape workplace struggle over changes in the labour 
process. 
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